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Without the assistance of Medicaid, more than twenty-five percent of all children 
in the United States would not have access to dental care.1  However, mere eligibility 
does not guarantee good dental health.  In fact, in many states, children enrolled in 
Medicaid rarely receive adequate dental care.2  In 2007, twelve-year-old Deamonte 
Driver died as the result of an infection from a tooth abscess spreading to his brain.3  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Shelly Gehshan, Andrew Snyder, & Julie Paradise, Filling an Urgent Need: Improving Children’s Access 
to Dental Care in Medicaid and SCHIP (National Academy for State Health Policy, Washington, D.C.), 
July 2008 at 1. (available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/7792.pdf).  An additional seven million 
children rely on the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP).  Id.  SCHIP covers some dental 
benefits for some children in families that do not qualify for Medicaid but cannot afford insurance.  This 
note focuses primarily on Medicaid structures.  For more information on how states administer SCHIP 
benefits, see Medicaid Compendium Update (American Dental Assn., Chicago, IL), 2008 (available at 
http://www.ada.org/2123.aspx).  The Patient Protection and Accountable Care Act (PPACA) will extend 
dental coverage to 5.3 million more children by 2014 through expansions to both Medicaid and SCHIP. 
The State of Children’s Dental Health: Making Coverage Matter (The Pew Center on the States, 
Washington, D.C.), May 2011 at 1 (available at 
http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/The_State_of_Children's_Dental_health.pdf).       
2 Low-income children suffer approximately twice as many cavities as other children.  These cavities are 
much more likely to go untreated as well.  Oral Health in America: A Report of the Surgeon General (U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services, National Institute of Dental and Craniofacial Research, 
National Institutes of Health, Rockville, MD), 2000.  
3 Lindy McCollum-Broundley, A Place to Call Home: Expanding Access to Dental Care for Children & 
Special Needs Patients, Gatordentist Today (Fall 2007) at 8 (available at 
http://www.dental.ufl.edu/Offices/News/publications/GDTNewsletter_Fall07.pdf).  
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Deamonte visited physicians all of his life but had never visited a dentist.4  The tooth 
abscess went undiagnosed until his mother, with the necessary help of one lawyer, one 
helpline supervisor, and three case management professionals, finally found a dentist in 
Maryland who accepted Medicaid.5  Only 900 out of 5,500 dentists in Maryland accepted 
Medicaid at the time.6  The cost of Deamonte’s subsequent brain surgeries and hospital 
stay totaled over a quarter of a million dollars.7  A simple tooth extraction would have 
cost approximately only eighty dollars and would have saved his life.8                    
Unfortunately, this story is not all too uncommon in the United States.  Only 
38.1% of Medicaid children received any dental care in 2009.9  The consequences of so 
many children failing to see a dentist has consequences that extend beyond just poor 
health indications.  Failing to encourage and provide adequate dental care results in far-
reaching social consequences for Medicaid patients and financial consequences for states.  
Patients that do not receive adequate dental care face social stigma.10  When a patient 
does not have access to preventive care, problems go untreated until the problem worsens 
enough to force the patient to seek emergency care.  Emergency care often entails tooth 
extraction.  Missing teeth signify poor social background.  Patients must then fight this 
stigma every time they interview for a new job.  This crisis also affects employers, as 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Id.  
5 The Silent Epidemic (Jan. 16, 2008),  http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=08HVcfxRg-k&feature=related.   
6June Thomas, The American Way of Dentistry: Why poor folks are short on teeth., Slate Magazine (Oct. 1, 
2009) (available at 
http://www.slate.com/articles/life/the_american_way_of_dentistry/2009/10/the_american_way_of_dentistr
y_3.html). 
7 Mary Otto, For Want of a Dentist, The Washington Post (Feb. 28, 2007) 
(http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/27/AR2007022702116.html).   
8 Id.  
9The State of Children’s Dental Health: Making Coverage Matter, supra note 1, at 10.  
10 S. Hyde, W.A. Satariano, & J.A. Weintraub, Welfare Dental Intervention Improves Employment and 
Quality of Life, J. OF DENTAL RES., no. 85 (2006) at 79-84. 
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poor dental health results in employees missing many hours of work each year.11  In 
addition to patients and employers, states suffer when dental indications go undiagnosed 
and untreated.  Emergency room visits for tooth decay-related indications are extremely 
expensive and, unfortunately, extremely common.12  Poor dental health is linked to more 
serious, chronic, and expensive health conditions.13  The earlier in life patients receive 
their first dental screening, the lower future treatment will cost the state.14  Thus, the 
incentives exist for states to address this growing dental health crisis.  However, the 
barriers to accomplishing this are not so easily overcome.   
Medicaid beneficiaries face many challenges in accessing dental care even when 
it is available.  Dentists often practice in affluent areas to where public transportation is 
extremely inconvenient.15  Patients in rural areas face even greater challenges.  In 2000, 
there were 224 counties where even private payers could not find a dentist.16  Many 
Medicaid patients are often unable to schedule appointments as few dental assistants 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 An estimated 164 million work hours each year are lost due to oral disease.  Mary McGinn-Shapiro, 
Medicaid Coverage of Adult Dental Services, NATIONAL ACADEMY FOR STATE HEALTH POLICY (2008) at 1 
(available at  
http://nashp.org/sites/default/files/Adult%20Dental%20Monitor.pdf?q=files/Adult%20Dental%20Monitor.
pdf). 
12 The amount of emergency room visits related to preventable dental conditions in 2009 rose sixteen 
percent to 830,590.  A study revealed that 330,000 cases cost approximately $110 million.   These costs are 
increasing.  For example, the average charge per emergency visit for young children with dental conditions 
increased by thirty percent over the last five years.  In Florida, approximately one-third of these visits in 
2010 were paid through Medicaid.   However, perhaps most alarmingly, the emergency room was the first 
“dental visit” for one in every four children in the state of Washington.  A Costly Dental Destination, (The 
Pew Center on the States, Washington, D.C.), Feb. 2012 at 1-3. (available at 
http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/A%20Costly%20Dental%20Destination.pdf).       
13 A study revealed that the average cost of care for children that received dental care before the age of one 
was more than half of the average cost of care for children that did not visit a dentist until ages four through 
five.  Matthew F. Savage, Jessica Y. Lee, Jonathan B. Kotch, William F. Vann, Jr., Early Preventive Dental 
Visits: Effects on Subsequent Utilization & Costs, NEOREVIEWS, Vol. 114, No. 4 (October 1, 2004) at 
e418-e423.  
14June Thomas, The American Way of Dentistry: Why poor folks are short on teeth., supra note 6.  
15 Id.   
16 Id.  
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speak multiple languages.17  Additionally, many Medicaid patients do not seek out dental 
care due to a lack of education about the importance of dental care and a lack of 
awareness that they actually have dental benefits.  Many Medicaid patients rely primarily 
on emergency rooms for their medical needs due to this lack of education and 
awareness.18  These barriers cause many Medicaid patients to miss appointments, further 
frustrating the few providers that will treat these patients.19  
Another barrier is a lack of dentists who are willing to accept Medicaid.  Apart 
from the inconveniences mentioned above, Medicaid administrative structures also 
frustrate providers.  Dentists avoid treating Medicaid patients because of low payment 
rates, inconvenient claims procedures, and slow payment.20  Dentists usually operate 
small businesses and incur high overhead costs.21  These costs cover about sixty percent 
of revenue.22  While increasing payment rates is the obvious first step, and perhaps a 
necessary step, in encouraging dentists to participate, it alone is not sufficient.23  Through 
structural reforms, states can target the problems of inconvenient procedures and slow 
payment.  Improvements in administrative efficiency will allow states to better allocate 
funds to pay dentists higher rates.   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 Id.  
18 Shelly Gehshan, Paetra Hauck, & Julie Scales, Increasing Dentists’ Participation in Medicaid and 
SCHIP, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (2001) (available at 
http://204.131.235.67/programs/health/Forum/oralhealth.htm#introbot).  
19 Id.  
20 Alison Borchgrevink, Andrew Snyder, & Shelly Gehshan, The Effects of Medicaid Reimbursement Rates 
on Access to Dental Care, NATIONAL ACADEMY FOR STATE HEALTH POLICY (2008) at 1 (available at 
http://www.nashp.org/sites/default/files/CHCF_dental_rates.pdf)).  
21 Shelly Gehshan, Andrew Snyder, & Julie Paradise, Filling an Urgent Need: Improving Children’s Access 
to Dental Care in Medicaid and SCHIP, supra note 1, at 9.  
22 Id.  
23 “A majority of experts interviewed felt that adequate reimbursement rates (meaning rates that at least met 
the overhead expenses of dentists in private practice) were necessary—but not sufficient on their own – to 
improve access to Medicaid dental services.  Simply injecting funding into higher rates was not thought to 
be enough to substantially improve the program.”  Alison Borchgrevink, Andrew Snyder, & Shelly 
Gehshan, The Effects of Medicaid Reimbursement Rates on Access to Dental Care, supra note 20, at 25.  
 5!
In order to overcome barriers to utilization and access, states should adopt the 
following three-fold approach: 1) States should provide outreach and education, 2) States 
should increase reimbursement rates paid to dental providers, and 3) States should reform 
their Medicaid administrative structures.   
States have many options in how they construct Medicaid administrative 
structures.  Congress amended the Social Security Act several times to allow states a 
considerable amount of freedom in how states can administer Medicaid benefits.24  Many 
states have taken advantage of these amendments by using managed care to improve the 
administrational of dental Medicaid benefits.25  However, states must be careful to 
contract with dental maintenance organizations on terms best suited to the unique area of 
dental health.26  To better serve the unique needs of dental providers and Medicaid 
patients, states should restructure their Medicaid structures by contracting with a single 
dental maintenance organization to exclusively provide dental benefits.  The state should 
assume at least some degree of risk, while capitalizing on the dental maintenance 
organization’s established network, expertise, and commonplace claims procedures.  The 
state should also ensure that the vendor pays providers on a fee-for-service basis.  Both 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 See infra Section I.  
25 Forty-two states contract with at least one third-party to help administer dental Medicaid benefits.  
Sixteen states administer at least some dental Medicaid benefits through typical managed care plans.  
Under the typical managed care model, the state transfers risk to the managed care organization (MCO) by 
paying the MCO on a per beneficiary per month basis.  However, states have increasingly switched to a 
more tempered form of managed care.  These vendors are often paid under administrative services only 
(ASO) contracts.  Thus, these vendors do not bear any risk but are still responsible for processing claims, 
maintaining networks, and responding to provider inquiries.  Thirty-one states administer at least some 
dental Medicaid benefits through nonrisk vendors.  Notice that some states contract with both types of 
vendors.  Medicaid Compendium Update (American Dental Assn., Chicago, IL), 2008 (available at 
http://www.ada.org/2123.aspx).     
26 If done improperly, administrative costs can increase while utilization and participation decline rapidly.  
This was the result of Florida’s Miami-Dade County Pilot program.  The state passed too much risk to both 
the vendor and providers, and providers did not receive adequate reimbursement.  See Burton L. Edelstein, 
Miami-Dade County Prepaid Dental Health Plan Demonstration: Less Value for State Dollars (Collins 
Center for Public Policy, Miami, FL) Aug. 2006.     
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quantitative and qualitative reasons support this approach as the ideal administrative 
structure for dental Medicaid benefits.     
Part I of this piece will outline the statutory framework through which states 
administer dental Medicaid benefits.  Part II briefly touches on how patient outreach and 
assistance programs can increase the utilization of dental services, thereby indirectly 
increasing provider participation.  Part III briefly discusses the need to increase 
reimbursement rates paid to providers in order to promote participation in Medicaid.  Part 
IV will discuss recent state reforms designed to deal with this dental crisis.  Part V 
evaluates how successful these different approaches have been in terms of the available 
quantitative data.  Part VI proposes how states can reform Medicaid administrative 
structures to best increase provider participation and utilization of dental services.   
    
I. Statutory Framework 
 
Title XIX of the Social Security Act only requires states to cover dental benefits 
for Medicaid-eligible individuals under the age of twenty-one.27  States have the option of 
whether or not to cover dental services for Medicaid-eligible adults.28  Dental benefits are 
guaranteed for eligible children as part of Medicaid’s Early and Periodic Screening, 
Diagnosis and Treatment (EPSDT) program.29  Under the EPSDT program, states 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 1396 et seq. (2012). 
28 In 2007, six states offered no coverage for adult dental Medicaid benefits, sixteen states covered only 
emergency services, thirteen states excluded at least one service category from coverage, and only sixteen 
states offered comprehensive coverage.  Mary McGinn-Shapiro, Medicaid Coverage of Adult Dental 
Services, supra note 11, at Figure 1.   
29 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 1396 et seq. (2012). 
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determine the scope of covered dental services within certain parameters.30  States also 
have considerable freedom in determining how these benefits are administered.  In fact, 
many states do not administer dental Medicaid benefits themselves, but rather mandate 
that all beneficiaries enroll in a plan administered by a private commercial entity, either a 
Dental Maintenance Organization (DMO) that resembles a typical Managed Care 
Organization (MCO), a Dental Benefits Manager (DBM) that does not take on risk, or a 
fiscal agent that performs administrative functions but does not manage other private 
health insurance plans.31  Other states administer dental benefits themselves through state 
agencies.32  While the Social Security Act originally forbade states from requiring that a 
Medicaid beneficiary enroll in a managed care plan, these restrictions were later 
relaxed.33  Section 2175 of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 198134 (“OBRA”) 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
30 At minimum, states must cover dental services for relief of pain and infections, restorative services, and 
services necessary for the maintenance of dental health.  States are also required to develop a dental 
periodicity schedule with the advice of recognized dental organizations.  A dental periodicity schedule 
determines when a screening is medically necessary. 42 U.S.C. §§§ 1396(r)(1)(B), 1396a(a)(43)(C), 
§1396d(r).       
31 Sixteen states (including the District of Columbia) enroll at least some Medicaid beneficiaries in typical 
managed care plans.  States are more likely to rely on managed care plans in urban areas if they choose to 
operate an additional, separate traditional fee-for-service system.   There has been a trend to move away 
from the global managed care system that about half of the states converted to in the 1990s.  Some states 
have completely tried to move away from contracting through commercial vendors, such as Maryland, 
which initiated a pilot program in 2008 to experiment with state-administered benefits.  Other states have 
retained managed care plans but mitigate the amount of risk borne by the vendor, such as Rhode Island, or 
prohibit plans from passing risk along to providers, such as Arizona.  Nonrisk vendors are typically refered 
to as Dental Benefits Managers (DBMs).  Other states similarly contract with nonrisk commercial agents 
but contract with agents that specialize in information technology rather than health network maintenance.  
For example, West Virginia contracts with Unisys, an information technology company that processes 
claims but also is responsible for provider enrollment.  Medicaid Compendium Update (American Dental 
Assn., Chicago, IL), 2008 (available at http://www.ada.org/2123.aspx); James J. Crall & Donald 
Schneider, Medicaid Program Administration (American Dental Assn., Chicago, IL), Mar. 2004 at 3 
(available at http://www.ada.org/sections/professionalResources/pdfs/medicaid_administration.pdf). 
32 For example, the Washington State Health Care Authority, a state agency within the Washington State 
Department of Social and Health Services, administers dental Medicaid benefits in Washington state.  The 
state does not contract with any fiscal agents. Medicaid Compendium Update (American Dental Assn., 
Chicago, IL), 2008 (available at http://www.ada.org/2123.aspx). 
33 For a discussion of the history of the use of managed care in Medicaid, see Nicolette Highsmith & 
Stephen A. Somers, Medicaid Managed Care: From Cost Savings to Accountability and Quality 
Improvement, EVAL. HEALTH PROF. Vol. 23, No. 4 (December 2000) at 385-396. 
34 The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357-933 (1981). 
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provided a waiver to allow states to mandate enrollment in managed care plans.35  This § 
1915(b) “freedom of choice” waiver became very popular.  By 1997, forty states operated 
at least one program through the § 1915(b) waiver.36  Another waiver also became 
popular in the early 1980s.  The § 1115 “research and demonstration” waiver was added 
in 1962, but in the 1980s, the Secretary of the Department of Human Health Services 
(HHS) began to approve states’ use of it to develop Medicaid managed care initiatives.37  
Through this section, the Secretary waived Medicaid’s freedom of choice mandates as 
well as other provisions of the Act, such as eligibility, provider, and administrative 
requirements.38  The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 now allows states to force 
beneficiaries to join managed care plans without obtaining a waiver.39  Many states that 
have reformed their dental Medicaid programs have done so through § 1115 waivers.40  
Other states should look to these administrative reforms as examples of how to improve 
dental health among Medicaid beneficiaries.  Along with raising reimbursement rates 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
35 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(b). 
36 42 U.S.C.S. § 1115; see also Sara Rosenbaum & Julie Darnell, Medicaid Managed Care: An Analysis of 
the Health Care Financing Administration’s Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, (The George Washington 
University Medical Center – Center for Health Policy Research, Washington, D.C.), 1998 at 4 (available at 
http://www.kff.org/medicaid/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PageID=14947).   
37 Sara Rosenbaum & Julie Darnell, Medicaid Managed Care: An Analysis of the Health Care Financing 
Administration’s Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 36, at 4-5.  
38 A § 1115 waiver permits the Secretary to approve programs that vary regionally, offer different benefits 
to different groups, expand eligibility standards, mandate enrollment in managed care, and make alterations 
to Medicaid payment requirements.  However, plans must not reduce access or quality of care, must be 
budget neutral, must guard against unnecessary utilization, and must maintain quality assurance processes.  
However, the rate at which the Federal government contributes to Medicaid expenditures cannot be waived.  
For a summary of § 1115 requirements, see 1115 Waiver, (ITUP Los Angeles Regional Workgroup, Los 
Angeles, CA) (available at http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/6267.pdf); see also Sara 
Rosenbaum & Julie Darnell, Medicaid Managed Care: An Analysis of the Health Care Financing 
Administration’s Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 36, at 4-5.  
39 Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33 (1997).  
40 See Leighton Ku, Marilyn Ellwood, Sheila Hoag, Barbara Ormond, & Judith Woolridge, Evolution of 
Medicaid Managed Care System and Eligibility Expansions, Health Care Financing Rev., Vol. 22, No. 2 
(Winter 2000) (available at http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-
Systems/Research/HealthCareFinancingReview/downloads//00winterpg7.pdf); see also 1115 Waiver, supra 
note 38.  
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paid to providers and establishing outreach and assistance programs, structural reform is 
a necessary piece of the puzzle of ending the current dental health crisis.          
 
II. Patient Outreach and Assistance  
 
Medicaid beneficiaries face barriers beyond the mere lack of dentists willing to 
treat Medicaid patients.  As previously explained, these barriers include: geographic 
barriers, language barriers, and social barriers.41  These problems can be addressed by 
providing outreach and assistance to Medicaid patients.  Examples include: conducting 
face-to-face meetings to discuss coverage and locate a dentist in the area,42 distributing 
educational materials,43 establishing hotlines and websites listing available providers,44 
and establishing a case management system to address cancellations and transportation 
problems.45 
Addressing these concerns will not only encourage Medicaid enrollees to seek 
care, but it will relieve inconvenience for providers.  As such, more providers will accept 
Medicaid patients, and then increased access to care will allow for greater utilization of 
that care.  However, compliance issues are not the only inconveniences faced by 
providers.  States must also address poor reimbursement and administrative hassles.   
  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
41 See supra text accompanying notes 15-19. 
42 For example, in South Carolina, Medicaid staff actually visits beneficiaries to discuss available benefits 
and to help locate a dentist.  For similar examples used by states, see James J. Crall & Donald Schneider, 
Enhancing Dental Medicaid Outreach and Care Coordination (American Dental Assn., Chicago, IL), Mar. 
2004 at 2. 
43 For example, brochures in Virginia and Washington are specifically tailored to the needs of Medicaid 
patients.  Id.  
44 For examples, see id. at 3.  
45 For example, in Michigan, local health departments contact families with children that are due for dental 
care and schedule appointments.  Id. at 2.  
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III. Reimbursement Rate Increases 
 
States must take the additional step of increasing reimbursement rates paid to 
providers for services performed on Medicaid patients.  Dentists incur high overhead 
costs but often do not receive sufficient reimbursement to cover these costs.46  In most 
states, Medicaid reimburses dentists less than half of what dentists receive from private 
payers.47  In some cases, dentists take a loss, and treating Medicaid patients becomes an 
act of charity.48  While many dentists readily accept fifteen to twenty percent discounts 
when participating in a preferred provider network in competitive markets, many 
Medicaid programs discount seventeen percent from the fiftieth percentile of fees 
charged by dentists.49  This results in fees that only twenty-five percent of area dentists 
would accept, without taking into account other Medicaid-specific burdens on 
providers.50  Increasing this provider base would allow for more patients to receive care 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
46 Andrew Snyder, Increasing Access to Dental Care in Medicaid: Targeted Programs for Four 
Populations (National Academy for State Health Policy, Washington, D.C.), Mar. 2009. at 1.  
47 For example, in 2010, Medicaid only reimbursed California dentists 32.8% of the median regional 
average retail fee.  The problem is worsened by the fact that the cost of living in California in 2010 was 
also over 30% higher than the national average cost of living.  See Appendix C; see also Andrew Snyder, 
Increasing Access to Dental Care in Medicaid: Targeted Programs for Four Populations, supra note 46, at 
1-2.  
48 For example, in Tennessee, prior to reform, dentists absorbed sixty percent of the cost of each procedure 
they performed on a Medicaid patient.  Alison Borchgrevink, Andrew Snyder, & Shelly Gehshan, The 
Effects of Medicaid Reimbursement Rates on Access to Dental Care, supra note 20, at 8. 
Some scholars note the detrimental effects of a health system that relies on such benevolence.  
Through the willingness of providers to treat patients despite inadequate compensation, government 
programs have been able to shift the cost of this care to private insurers and providers.  Political leaders 
then escape accountability for the health of the nation’s uninsured poor.  They are free to vote down 
initiatives that would offer more coverage to this population, as it is easier to rely on the benevolence of 
providers.  Frank Pasquale, Dental Dilemmas and the Limits of Charity, Concurring Opinions, 
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2007/12/dental_dilemmas.html (Dec. 24, 2007) (citing Uwe 
Reinhardt, US Health Care Stands Adam Smith on His Head, BMJ 335(7628), 1020 (Nov. 17, 2007)).   
49 James J. Crall & Donald Schneider, Medicaid Reimbursement – Using Marketplace Principles to 
Increase Access to Dental Services, (American Dental Association, Chicago, IL) 2004 at 1-2 (available at 
http://www.ada.org/sections/professionalResources/pdfs/medicaid_reimbursement.pdf).  
50 Id. 
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and would cut down on patient travel time.51  Increasing rates is necessary for this to 
happen.52     
While increasing payment rates is the obvious first step, and a necessary step, in 
encouraging dentists to participate, it alone is not sufficient.53  Administrative burdens 
must also be addressed.  Increasing rates is also the more difficult piece of the solution 
politically and can counteract gains if state spending spurs inflation.54  Even states that 
have demonstrated a dedication to improving rates for dental services, such as Arizona, 
have had their efforts staunched by recent budgetary crises.55  In order to sustain effective 
rates, states face the decision to allocate more funds to Medicaid budgets or to make 
Medicaid structures more efficient.  The latter goal can be accomplished through 
administrative reforms.  If states contract with private vendors on proper terms, these 
private vendors will more efficiently and effectively administer dental Medicaid benefits. 
 
IV. Different State Approaches56  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
51 Michigan improved dental utilization and cut patient travel time in half by improving provider 
participation rates from about twenty-five percent to eighty percent from 2000 to 2001.  Medicaid, 
American Dental Association, http://www.ada.org/2387.aspx (last visited May 4, 2012).  
52 Alison Borchgrevink, Andrew Snyder, & Shelly Gehshan, The Effects of Medicaid Reimbursement Rates 
on Access to Dental Care, supra note 20, at 25. 
53 Id.   
54 Id. 
55 See Kevin Sack, Arizona Medicaid Cuts Seen as a Sign of the Times, THE N.Y. TIMES, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/05/us/05transplant.html (Dec. 4, 2010).  
56 Of the fifty states and the District of Columbia, twenty-five states administer dental benefits together 
with medical benefits, twenty-two states employ carve-outs, and four states administer dental benefits 
partially through a carve-out.  Nine states choose to administer dental Medicaid benefits themselves, while 
thirty-two states contract with fiscal agents and ten states contract with fiscal agents but still administer 
some benefits.  These fiscal agents come in many forms, including DMOs, nonrisk DBMs, and claims 
processing agencies.  Of those states that contracted out administrative responsibilities, twenty-four states 
did not transfer any risk to the contractor, eleven states transferred some degree of risk, and seven states 
transferred risk to some vendors but not others.  Of the forty-two states that contract with third-party 
agents, twenty-one states contract with multiple agents and twenty-one states contract with only a single 
agent.  Forty-two states reimburse providers on a fee-for-service basis, nine states employ both fee-for-
service and capitation, and no states reimburse providers just through capitated payments. Medicaid 
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a. Tennessee 
In 2002, Tennessee performed a complete overhaul of its Medicaid structure.57  
Prior to 2002, Tennessee used multiple managed care organizations to administer both 
medical and dental benefits.58  Under this program, only 386 dental providers treated 
Medicaid beneficiaries, and only thirty-six percent of enrollees ages six through twenty 
received any dental care.59  In John B. v. Menke,60 the United States District Court for the 
Middle District of Tennessee held that Tennessee violated federal EPSDT requirements 
by failing to provide adequate dental care as well as other EPSDT benefits.  The court 
ordered that the state carve out its under-twenty one population from the overall 
Medicaid structure.61  Tennessee went even farther by further carving out the 
administration of dental services from the administration of other EPSDT services.62  
Where multiple managed care organizations continue to administer general Medicaid 
benefits, Tennessee contracted with only one dental benefits manager (DBM) to 
administer dental benefits.63  Tennessee’s DBM, Doral Dental, operates under an 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Compendium Update (American Dental Assn., Chicago, IL), 2008 (available at 
http://www.ada.org/2123.aspx).  Section IV offers a survey of these different approaches.        
57 Tennessee first implemented a Medicaid managed care in 1994 under a Section 1115 waiver from the 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid (CMS).   This program, named “TennCare” expired on June 30, 2002.  
The 2002 reforms resulted in a new demonstration program, named “TennCare II,” which will operate 
through June 30, 2013.  For an overview of TennCare, see TennCare Overview (last visited April 25, 
2012), http://www.tn.gov/tenncare/news-about.html.  
58 Kim McPherson, State Strategies to Improve Dental Compliance in Missouri’s Medicaid Population, 
HEALTH POLICY PUBLICATION (Missouri Foundation for Health, St. Louis, MO), Summer 2008 at 9 
(available at http://www.mffh.org/mm/files/DentalComplianceMFH.pdf). 
59 David Neumeister, State and Community Models for Improving Access to Dental Care for the 
Underserved – A White Paper (American Dental Assn., Chicago, IL), Oct. 2004 at 15 (available at 
http://www.ada.org/sections/advocacy/pdfs/topics_access_whitepaper.pdf).  
60 176 F. Supp. 2d 786 (M.D. Tenn. 2001)  
61 Id. at 807.  
62 David Neumeister, State and Community Models for Improving Access to Dental Care for the 
Underserved – A White Paper, supra note 59, at 15. 
63 Kim McPherson, State Strategies to Improve Dental Compliance in Missouri’s Medicaid Population, 
supra note 58, at 9.  
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administrative services only (ASO) contract.64  Under an ASO contract, the state takes on 
full risk for the cost of benefit claims and pays the vendor an administrative fee.  In 
return, the DBM maintains a network of providers, processes claims, pays providers, and 
performs review procedures.65  Tennessee also increased the rate of reimbursement to the 
75th percentile of regional commercial fees.66    
By 2007, provider participation improved by approximately one hundred twenty 
percent.67  Utilization of dental care by children improved from thirty-six percent to fifty-
one percent within four years of these reforms.68  Before these reforms, providers only 
received forty percent of their cost for each procedure.69  In reforming the program, 
Tennessee followed the suggestions of the ADA and switched to rates matched to the 
seventy-fifth percentile of dental fees in the East South Central region.70  Dentists now 
earn a profit rather than taking a loss for treating a Medicaid patient.  Financing is 
determined year to year by state appropriations, so the legislature has ultimate control 
over the fee schedule.71        
          
b. Arizona 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 9-10.  
66 David Neumeister, State and Community Models for Improving Access to Dental Care for the 
Underserved – A White Paper, supra note 59, at 15. 
67Alison Borchgrevink, Andrew Snyder, & Shelly Gehshan, The Effects of Medicaid Reimbursement Rates 
on Access to Dental Care, supra note 20, at 8. 
68 Id. 
69 Id.  
70 David Neumeister, State and Community Models for Improving Access to Dental Care for the 
Underserved – A White Paper, supra note 59, at 16.    
71 Id. at 17.  
 14!
Arizona relies on eighteen different MCOs to administer both medical and dental 
services.72  The state, therefore, does not rely on a carve-out.  Arizona takes advantage of 
the integration of the administration dental and medical benefits by requiring physicians 
to screen for dental problems and refer patients to dentists.73  Medicaid beneficiaries tend 
to rely more heavily on primary care than they do dental care.74  Through this referral 
process, Arizona sought to work around this reliance on primary care in order to 
encourage utilization.75  Arizona addressed the problems of access and utilization further 
by restricting MCOs in terms of how they pay dentists, what benefits they offer, and how 
they must maintain their networks.  Arizona expressly prohibits plans from capitating 
providers.76  The Interim Study Committee on Dental Care found that providers were 
attracted to plans that paid on a fee-for-service basis.77  Arizona also requires that plans 
offer minimum dental benefits.78  This includes ensuring that beneficiaries can see the 
dentist at least twice a year for preventive care and that the care that they receive is !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
72 Caroline Davis & Gretchen Brown, Managing California’s Medicaid Dental Program: Lessons from 
Other States (California HealthCare Foundation, Oakland, CA), July 2009 at 9 (available at 
http://www.chcf.org/~/media/MEDIA%20LIBRARY%20Files/PDF/M/PDF%20MedicaidDentalLessonsSt
ates.pdf).  
73 Arizona revised its Medical Policy Manual by imposing new mandates on physicians.  Medical Policy 
Manual § 430(A)(7) (available at http://www.phxautism.org/wp-content/pdf/resources-
advocacy/2.%20EPSDT%20Service,%20Policy%20430.pdf); see also Kim McPherson, State Strategies to 
Improve Dental Compliance in Missouri’s Medicaid Population, supra note 58, at 15. 
74 Many Medicaid patients have never been educated about the importance of preventive dental care.  It is 
commonly the case that dental indications go unscreened and untreated until the indication has evolved into 
a more complex health issue.  It is only then where the patient seeks care in the emergency room of a 
hospital, which are often ill-equipped to handle dental care.  See, e.g., Lindy McCollum-Broundley, A 
Place to Call Home: Expanding Access to Dental Care for Children & Special Needs Patients, supra note 
3. 
75 Kim McPherson, State Strategies to Improve Dental Compliance in Missouri’s Medicaid Population, 
supra note 58, at 15 (“Research has found that children who receive medical care are more likely to receive 
dental care than those who received no medical care.”).  
76 Caroline Davis & Gretchen Brown, Managing California’s Medicaid Dental Program: Lessons from 
Other States, supra note 72, at 9.  
77 ACCCHS DENTAL CARE TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT (April 2008) (available at 
http://azahcccs.gov/reporting/Downloads/DentalCareTaskForce_1998.pdf) (“the majority of the health 
plans have implemented fee-for-service reimbursement arrangements effective October 1997 which have 
significantly increased the number of dental providers”).  
78 For a list of benefits, see Medical Policy Manual § 430(A)(7).   
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consistent with the community standard of care.79  The state also requires plans to meet 
minimum network requirements.80  Dentists receive relatively high rates of 
reimbursement in Arizona.  Of all of the states (including the District of Columbia), 
Arizona offered the fifth highest rate of reimbursement in 2010.81 Dentists are currently 
paid 68.9 percent of median retail fees.82  However, providers face future payment cuts in 
the wake of ongoing budget cuts.83  Medicaid utilization increased from below thirty 
percent in 2000, when payment structure reform had just taken place, to 47.2% in 2009.84  
Dentists are currently paid 68.9 percent of median retail fees.85  However, providers face 
future payment cuts in the wake of ongoing budget cuts.86 
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79 Medical Policy Manual §§ 430(A)(7)(b)(1), 430(C).  
80 Caroline Davis & Gretchen Brown, Managing California’s Medicaid Dental Program: Lessons from 
Other States, supra note 72, at 9. 
81 The State of Children’s Dental Health: Making Coverage Matter (The Pew Center on the States, 
Washington, D.C.), May 2011 at 25.  
82 Caroline Davis & Gretchen Brown, Managing California’s Medicaid Dental Program: Lessons from 
Other States, supra note 72, at 9. 
83 Arizona reduced its Medicaid dental fee schedule by 5% in 2001. ACCCHS, PUBLIC NOTICE OF 
INFORMATION (April, 1, 2011) (available at 
http://www.azahcccs.gov/publicnotices/Downloads/rates/April2011FFSRates.pdf).  However, the current 
governor seeks to restore these rates by 2013.  See STATE AGENCY BUDGETS, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE 
GOVERNOR, EXECUTIVE BUDGET OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA, FISCAL YEAR 2013 (2012).  Budget 
constraints have also led Arizona to eliminate coverage for emergency dental procedures.  Such cuts are not 
all too uncommon.  According to a report by the Kaiser Family Foundation, 29 states reduced payments to 
providers and 20 cut benefits not required by federal law in 2010. See Kevin Sack, Arizona Medicaid Cuts 
Seen as a Sign of the Times, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Dec. 4, 2010) (available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/05/us/05transplant.html). 
84 The State of Children’s Dental Health: Making Coverage Matter - Arizona (The Pew Center on the 
States, Washington, D.C.), May 2011 (available at 
http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewcenteronthestatesorg/Initiatives/Childrens_D
ental_Health/048_11_DENT_50_State_Factsheets_Arizona_052311_web.pdf). 
85 Id.  
86 Arizona reduced its Medicaid dental fee schedule by 5% in 2001. ACCCHS, PUBLIC NOTICE OF 
INFORMATION (April, 1, 2011) (available at 
http://www.azahcccs.gov/publicnotices/Downloads/rates/April2011FFSRates.pdf).  However, the current 
governor seeks to restore these rates by 2013.  See STATE AGENCY BUDGETS, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE 
GOVERNOR, EXECUTIVE BUDGET OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA, FISCAL YEAR 2013 (2012).  Budget 
constraints have also led Arizona to eliminate coverage for emergency dental procedures.  Such cuts are not 
all too uncommon.  According to a report by the Kaiser Family Foundation, 29 states reduced payments to 
providers and 20 cut benefits not required by federal law in 2010. See Kevin Sack, Arizona Medicaid Cuts 
Seen as a Sign of the Times, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Dec. 4, 2010) (available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/05/us/05transplant.html). 
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c. Rhode Island 
In 2006, Rhode Island initiated its RIte Smiles program.87  Rhode Island switched 
from a traditional state-administered fee-for-service structure to a managed care 
structure.88  The state phased in the program at a relatively moderate pace.  Currently, 
only thirty-one percent of Medicaid EPSDT-eligible children receive dental benefits 
under this managed care structure.89  Rhode Island relies on only one commercial 
vendor.90  Both the state and its vendor, UnitedHealthcare Dental, share the financial 
risk.91  The DMO receives a fixed monthly payment per child enrolled.92  However, risk-
sharing and gain-sharing provisions ensure adequate coverage.93  The vendor pays 
dentists on a fee-for-service basis.94  Rhode Island issued several mandates to its vendor.  
The state charged the vendor with the responsibility of establishing and maintaining an 
adequate network of providers.95  The state also charged the vendor with the task of 
increasing provider rates closer to those paid by private preferred-provider 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
87 Rhode Island implemented the RIte Smiles program originally under a § 1915(b) waiver, though it now 
operates under a § 1115 waiver.  The program was designed to further the success of the Oral Health 
Access Project.  Specifically, the state sought to eventually decrease Medicaid expenditures by encouraging 
more utilization of preventive dental care and decreasing reliance on emergency and restorative procedures. 
CHRISTINE A. PAYNE, MEDICAID RESEARCH AND EVALUATION PROJECT, RHODE ISLAND DEPT. OF HUMAN 
SERVICES, RITE SMILES EVALUATION REPORT: TRENDS FROM 2002-2008 (May 17, 2010) at 4 (available at 
http://www.dhs.ri.gov/Portals/0/Uploads/Documents/Public/Reports/ritesmiles_trends_2002_2008.pdf). 
88 Id. at 8 (“Rhode Island transitioned from functioning simply as a payer of services to becoming a 
purchaser of a new oral health delivery system”). 
89 Medicaid Compendium Update (American Dental Assn., Chicago, IL), 2008 (available at 
http://www.ada.org/2123.aspx). 
90 Id.  
91 Id.  
92 Id.  
93 Caroline Davis & Gretchen Brown, Managing California’s Medicaid Dental Program: Lessons from 
Other States, supra note 72, at 9. 
94 Medicaid Compendium Update (American Dental Assn., Chicago, IL), 2008 (available at 
http://www.ada.org/2123.aspx). 
95 CHRISTINE A. PAYNE, MEDICAID RESEARCH AND EVALUATION PROJECT, supra note 87, at 10-12.  
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organizations.96  Provider reimbursement rates remain relatively low.  In 2010, dentists 
received only 35.4 percent of average national median retail fees.97            
Rhode Island successfully improved access and utilization.  Only twenty-seven 
providers participated in Rhode Island’s older Medicaid program.98  This number 
increased to one hundred eighty by 2010.99  More children also received more care.  In 
2005, before Rhode Island implemented its reforms, only 34.5 percent of children 
received at least one dental service per year.100  In 2010, four years after implementation, 
this rate increased by 28.1 percent to 44.2 percent of children receiving at least one dental 
service.101  Total preventive visits increased by thirty-three percent and total treatment 
visits increased by fifty percent.102            
 
d. Florida’s Miami-Dade County Pilot Program  
Florida’s attempt at reform proved not as successful.103  Under Florida’s 
traditional Medicaid dental structure, the state contracts directly with dentists.104  The 
state typically pays dentists on a fee-for-service basis.105  In 2004, Florida looked to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
96 Id.  
97 The State of Children’s Dental Health: Making Coverage Matter (The Pew Center on the States, 
Washington, D.C.), May 2011 at 25. 
98 CHRISTINE A. PAYNE, MEDICAID RESEARCH AND EVALUATION PROJECT, supra note 87, at 12. 
99 Id. 
100 Assessing the Impact of RI’s Managed Oral Health Program (RIte Smiles) on Access and Utilization of 
Dental Care among Medicaid Children Ages Ten Years and Younger, MEDICINE & HEALTH RHODE ISLAND 
(Rhode Island Medical Society, Providence, RI), Aug. 2011 at 248.  
101 Id.  
102 Id.  
103 A study by Dr. Burton L. Edelstein concluded that the program failed in terms of value.  The study 
defined value as “the benefit to the state in terms of quality of care for Medicaid dollars expended.”  Burton 
L. Edelstein, Miami-Dade County Prepaid Dental Health Plan Demonstration: Less Value for State 
Dollars (Collins Center for Public Policy, Miami, FL) Aug. 2006 (available at 
http://www.collinscenter.org/resource/resmgr/Health_Care_Docs/MDCoPrepdDentalAnalysis8-06.pdf). 
104 See Understanding the Impacts of Florida’s Medicaid Pre-Paid Dental Pilot, ORAL HEALTH ISSUE 
BRIEF (2006) (available at 
http://www.collinscenter.org/resource/resmgr/Health_Care_Docs/Oral_Health_Pilot_Policy_Bri.pdf).   
105 Id. 
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managed care as a means of switching from being “payers” of dental care to being 
“purchasers.”106  In the Medicaid Pre-Paid Dental Pilot, Florida contracted with a single 
vendor, Atlantic Dental, Inc. (ADI).107  ADI bore the full risk for the cost of claims.108  In 
turn, ADI passed the risk on to dentists by paying them an average amount of $4.28 per 
patient per month instead of paying for individual services performed.109   
This program failed to deliver value.110  Costs increased by one percent as quality 
declined.111  Enrolled children visited the dentist less.112  Utilization declined by forty-
two percent.113  Dentist participation dropped by fifty-nine percent.114  
 
e. South Carolina 
South Carolina does not employ a carve-out.  While beneficiaries have the option 
to receive medical benefits from either a primary care case management program or the 
state’s traditional Medicaid fee-for-service structure, the state administers all dental 
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106 Id.  
107 Id.  
108 Id. 
109 Id.  
110 See supra note 103.  
111 Total costs increased from $14.9 million to $15.1 million, a one percent increase.  Quality of care 
declined as fewer patients received timely care.  Interestingly, however, consumer satisfaction remained 
high.  Burton L. Edelstein, Miami-Dade County Prepaid Dental Health Plan Demonstration: Less Value 
for State Dollars, supra note 103, at 3-5.  The consumer satisfaction survey may be suspect because 
“[s]tates must take any positive feedback from Medicaid beneficiaries with a grain of salt…since many 
Medicaid beneficiaries have never had good care and are therefore not the best judges of the level of care 
they ought to receive.”  Lisa Axelrod, The Trend Toward Medicaid Managed Care: Is the Government 
Selling Out the Medicaid Poor?, 7 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 215, 267 (1998).  
112 Burton L. Edelstein, Miami-Dade County Prepaid Dental Health Plan Demonstration: Less Value for 
State Dollars, supra note 103, at 3 (“The average umber of dental visits per enrolled child decreased by 
61% (from 0.60 visits to 0.24 visits)”).  
113 Id. (“The percent of children “continuously” enrolled in the program who received at least one dental 
visit declined by 42% (from 29% to 16%)”).  
114 Id. (“The number of Dade County dentists who provided services to at least one child declined 59% 
(from 669 dentists to 276 dentists)”).  
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Medicaid benefits through its traditional Medicaid fee-for-service system.115  South 
Carolina does not contract with any commercial agents to provide administrative services 
either.116  The South Carolina Department of Health and Human Services (SCHHS) 
handles claim processing and directly enrolls dental providers.117  SCHHS then pays 
providers on a fee-for-service basis.118  In 2000, SCHHS did employ administrative 
reforms, however, in an effort to encourage provider participation.119  SCHHS eased 
preauthorization requirements, streamlined claim procedures, and allowed extra 
reimbursement for additional time spent treating children with special needs.120  The state 
also increased reimbursement to match the seventy-fifth percentile of regional 
commercial dental fees, but these rates have not been increased since.121   
These reforms resulted in a 31.8% increase in provider participation within one 
year.122  Utilization only increased 4.3% during this year.123  However, within seven 
years of these reforms, utilization increased by 63.8% and provider participation 
increased by 93.4%.124     
For a summary of these administrative approaches, see Appendix B.  For a 
comparison of the effectiveness of these approaches, see Appendix A.  
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115 Medicaid Compendium Update (American Dental Assn., Chicago, IL), 2008 (available at 
http://www.ada.org/2123.aspx).  
116 Id. 
117 Id.  
118 Id. 
119 Kim McPherson, State Strategies to Improve Dental Compliance in Missouri’s Medicaid Population, 
supra note 58, at 9.  
120 Id.  
121 Strides in Dental Access for Low-Income Children: Lessons Learned from Six States with Major Dental-
Medicaid Reforms (Doral), 2007 at 5.  
122 See id. at 4-5; see also Alison Borchgrevnik, Andrew Snyder, & Shelly Gehshan, Increasing Access to 
Dental Care in Medicaid: Does Raising Provider Rates Work? (California Healthcare Foundation, 
Oakland, CA), March 2008, at 3.  
123 Alison Borchgrevnik, Andrew Snyder, & Shelly Gehshan, Increasing Access to Dental Care in 
Medicaid: Does Raising Provider Rates Work?, supra note 122 at 3.  
124 Id.  
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V. Quantitative Evaluation of State Approaches125 
 
While most states experienced improvement in utilization and provider 
participation between 2000 and 2009, some states experienced more success than 
others.126  Additionally, some states experienced improvement in less time than others.  
These improvements can be attributed to numerous factors, including increased 
reimbursement rates, new assistance programs, and administrative reform.  Most states 
incorporated all three changes into their reforms.127  Though utilization and provider 
participation are influenced by more than just administrative reform, these administrative 
reforms may account for a considerable percentage of improvement.   
While states with relatively high payment rates often experienced better than 
average rates of utilization,128 the trend does not account for the experiences of all states.  
Some states succeeded in improving utilization without relying on significantly high rates 
of reimbursement.  In 2007, of the twenty-seven states (including the District of 
Columbia but excluding Mississippi, Delaware, and Kentucky)129 that demonstrated 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
125 In this section, I rely on rates of improvement in utilization and provider participation in states that 
employed different administrative models.  I also rely on a comparison of 2007 utilization rates with 2007 
reimbursement rates (as the percent of regional median retail fees reimbursed by Medicaid).  I also compare 
2009 utilization rates with 2010 average rates of reimbursement (as the percent of 2009 average regional 
retail fees reimbursed by Medicaid in 2010).  Neither data set allows for any definite conclusions.  The 
former data set may not reflect changes since 2007.  The latter data set requires the assumption that the 
2010 reimbursement rates were the same as in 2009.     
126 See The State of Children’s Dental Health: Making Coverage Matter, supra note 1, at 22. 
127 See Strides in Dental Access for Low-Income Children: Lessons Learned from Six States with Major 
Dental-Medicaid Reforms (Doral), 2007.  
128 In 2007, eleven of twenty-one states that paid providers above the national average rate demonstrated 
above average rates of utilization.  See Appendix D.  In 2009/2010, eleven of the eighteen states that paid 
providers above the national average rate demonstrated above average rates of utilization.  See Appendix C.   
129 Insufficient data exists to include these states in the 2007 study.  New Jersey’s statistics appear 
somewhat suspect because the 2007 study suggests that providers received 105.7% of regional retail fees 
and the 2009/2010 study suggests that providers received 42.8%.  New Jersey also recently tried to improve 
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above average utilization rates, sixteen states did so with payment rates below the 
national average.130  In 2009, of the twenty-seven states (including the District of 
Columbia) that demonstrated utilization rates above the national average, sixteen states 
also did so with 2010 payment rates below the national average.131  This suggests that 
states can improve utilization without significantly raising reimbursement rates.  These 
states used a variety of approaches in administering dental Medicaid benefits.132  
However, most rely on a single non-risk commercial agent to administer dental Medicaid 
benefits through a carve-out and pay providers on a fee-for-service basis.133  In fact, all of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
participation by reducing claim processing duration rather than increasing reimbursement rates. Caroline 
Davis & Gretchen Brown, Managing California’s Medicaid Dental Program: Lessons from Other States, 
supra note 72, at 12.  My analysis includes New Jersey for lack of a clear explanation to suggest that this 
data is incorrect, even though it seems suspect.  Compare Appendix C with Appendix D. 
130 These states include: New Mexico, Hawaii, Indiana, Kansas, Colorado, Virginia, West Virginia, 
Alabama, Vermont, Idaho, Utah, Washington, Iowa, Ohio, Nebraska, and Rhode Island.  See Appendix D.  
131 These states include: Virginia, Indiana, South Carolina, North Carolina, Kansas, Vermont, Alabama, 
New Mexico, Colorado, Nebraska, Illinois, Iowa, Washington, Idaho, Hawaii, and Rhode Island.  See 
Appendix C.    
132 In 2007, the sixteen states with above average utilization and below average reimbursement rates 
followed the following approaches. Eleven states used carve outs, while five used integrated structures. 
Five states administered benefits themselves, nine contracted with some kind of outside agent, and two 
states did both. Of the eleven states that contracted with outside agents, four contracted with multiple 
agents, while seven only contracted with one agent. Of the eleven states that contracted with outside agents, 
only two assigned some degree of risk to the agents.  All of the sixnteen states that demonstrated above 
average utilization with below average reimbursement rates paid providers on a fee-for-service basis.  See 
Appendix D; see also Appendix E.   
In 2009/2010, the sixteen states with above average utilization and below average reimbursement 
rates followed the following approaches. Eleven states used carve outs, while five used integrated 
structures. Four states administered benefits themselves, ten contracted with some kind of outside agent, 
and two states did both. Of the twelve states that contracted with outside agents, four contracted with 
multiple agents, while eight only contracted with one agent. Of the twelve states that contracted with 
outside agents, only two assigned some degree of risk to the agents. All of the seventeen states that 
demonstrated above average utilization with below average reimbursement rates paid providers on a fee-
for-service basis.  See Appendix C; see also Appendix E.  
133 The ratio of states with above average utilization rates and below average reimbursement rates that 
employ the approaches suggested by this note to those that do not, in most cases, exceeds the ratio of all 
states that employ these approaches to those that do not.  This demonstrates that these results reflect a trend 
rather than just the national distribution of approaches.  The ratio of these selected states that used carve-
outs to those that did not is 11:5; the national ratio is 26:25.  The ratio of these states that contracted out 
administrative duties to those that did not is 11:5; the national ratio is 14:3.  The ratio of these states that 
contracted with just one third-party to those that contracted with multiple third parties is 7:4; the national 
ratio is 1:1.  The ratio of these states that did not transfer risk to contractors to states that did transfer some 
degree of risk is 4:1; the national ratio is 4:3.  The ratio of these states that paid providers on a fee-for-
service basis to those that used some degree of capitation was 17:0; the national ratio is 14:3.  The only 
 22!
the sixteen states paid providers on a fee-for-service basis.  Fee-for-service payment 
appears a better option than capitated payment also because none of the states using any 
degree of capitation demonstrated a utilization rate above the national average.134   Thus, 
because states have demonstrated success without relying on significantly high 
reimbursement rates, this model appears to be the most preferable option.   
Furthermore, trends in utilization rates following certain types of administrative 
reforms suggest that a single vendor system may be preferable.  While every approach to 
reform resulted in improvement, states that contracted through a single vendor generally 
experienced more instantaneous progress than states that administrated dental Medicaid 
benefits through a state agency or through multiple managed care plans.  Tennessee, 
Rhode Island, Virginia, and Indiana all experienced better initial results than did South 
Carolina, Arizona, and New Jersey.135   
  Data reflecting the failures of states to meet the national average utilization rate 
suggests that high reimbursement rates do not necessarily translate into high utilization 
rates.  In 2007, of the twenty-one states that demonstrated below-average utilization 
rates,136 eleven states did so with payments rates above the national average.137  This 
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ratio that did not exceed the national ratio was that of states that contracted out administrative duties to 
those that did not.  However, the difference was not great enough to suggest that self-administration by 
states was a preferable option to contracting out these duties.  See Appendix D; see also Appendix E.       
134 See Appendix C. 
135 See Appendix A.  
136 I exclude Delaware and Kentucky due to a lack of available data.  In 2007, both Delaware and Kentucky 
failed to meet the national average utilization rate, so, in total twenty-three states did not meet the national 
average utilization rate in 2007.  See Appendix D.  
137 These states include: New Jersey, the District of Columbia, South Dakota, Wyoming, Arkansas, 
Maryland, New York, Louisiana, North Dakota, Nevada, and Missouri.  See Appendix D.     
The data from 2009/2010 is less clear.  In 2009/2010, of the twenty-three states that demonstrated 
below-average utilization rates, seven states did so with payment rates above the national average.  These 
states include: Delaware, Alaska, North Dakota, Wyoming, Louisiana, and Connecticut.  See Appendix C.  
Some of these states, such as Alaska, North Dakota, and Wyoming, face challenges related to geography.  
However, failures by Delaware and Connecticut to sustain high utilization rates do not allow for any 
conclusions to be drawn.  Both states employ nearly polar opposite administrative approaches.  Delaware’s 
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suggests that reimbursement rates are not the only factor affecting utilization.  Of these 
states that failed to meet the national average utilization rate with payment rates above 
the national average, most states used an integrated structure and contracted out at least 
some administrative duties.138  However, most of these states contracted with multiple 
vendors, and most transferred risk to these vendors.139  Far more of these states capitated 
providers than did the states that met the national average utilization rate without 
reimbursing providers higher than average rates.140  This again suggests that a carve-out 
administered by a single nonrisk vendor that pays providers on a fee-for-service basis is a 
preferable mode of administration.              
While some trends are discernible from this data, a quantitative approach may not 
be wholly sufficient.  It is difficult to account for all of the many factors that affect 
utilization and provider participation.  No state is the same as another, so one cannot 
expect reforms to encourage improvement at the same rate.  Medicaid beneficiaries in 
some states may face more language barriers than others, while those in other states may 
face more geographical barriers.  In many cases, factors that affect dentist participation !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
state Medicaid agency administers dental Medicaid benefits without the help of an outside contractor.  In 
fact, dental providers in Delaware interact more with the state agency than do providers in other states.  
Dental providers have to enroll directly with the fee-for-service program or with one of the eight state-
operated clinics.   Until 1997, in order to treat Medicaid patients, providers worked as direct employees of 
the state-run clinics.  On the other hand, Connecticut’s reforms in the early 2000s mirror those proposed by 
this note.  Connecticut created a carve-out and reduced the amount of vendors it contracted with to one 
vendor.  Connecticut also ceased transferring risk to its vendors. Burton L. Edelstein, Understanding the 
Connecticut Dental Medicaid Reform Proposal: State Options in Contracting Dental Care in Medicaid 
(Connecticut Health Foundation, Hartford, CT), Mar. 2003 (available at http://www.cthealth.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/04/understanding-the-ct-dental-medicaid-reform-proposal.pdf).  Thus, the isolated 
experiences of two states may not offer sufficient data to draw any conclusion that one approach is better 
than the other.                 
138   Eight states used integrated systems, while only three used carve-outs.  Nine contracted out at least 
some administrative duties, while two did not.  See Appendix D; see also Appendix E.     
139 Six contracted with multiple vendors, while only three contracted with a single vendor.  Six states 
transferred at least some risk to these vendors, while only three did not.    
140 While no states that demonstrated above-average utilization rates with below-average reimbursement 
rates paid providers on a capitated basis, four of the eleven states that fell below the national average 
utilization rate with above-average reimbursement rates capitated at least some providers.   
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may not be easily quantifiable.  For example, forces beyond payment and administrative 
ease encourage dentists to treat Medicaid patients.  Many dentists feel a sense of 
obligation to their communities to help those in need despite low payment and 
administrative hassles.141  This draw is difficult to quantify.  The available research may 
simply not be comprehensive enough to account for all of these possible factors.142  
However, a single vendor system, in which the vendor takes on little or no risk and pays 
providers on a fee-for-service basis, presents itself as the ideal administrative structure 
for other more qualitative reasons.             
  
VI. The Ideal Administrative Reform 
 
 States have increased participation by dentists and utilization by enrollees through 
administrative reforms.  States can reform Medicaid structures across five dimensions.  
First, states can carve-out dental benefits from existing Medicaid administrative 
structures or integrate dental benefits with medical benefits.  Second, states can 
administer Medicaid dental benefits themselves or do so through private vendors.  Third, 
if a state adopts the latter approach, the state must decide whether to contract with a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
141 Dentists Not Impressed with Medicaid, The Wealthy Dentist, 
http://thewealthydentist.com/surveyresults/084-dental-medicaid-patients.htm (last visited April 23, 2012).  
142 Social science assessments, such as these, are made difficult to quantify with empirical evidence 
because of a lack of research analyzing the human and social consequences of different approaches.  This is 
certainly true, at least, in so far as it applies to the assessment of new technologies.  Researchers mainly 
focus on whether new technologies perform as intended and on diagnostic accuracy.  Often times, little is 
known about the actual impact on the patient’s health or on social consequences, such as the cost 
effectiveness of the new technology.  The question of cost effectiveness may be the most crucial inquiry 
when available health resources in the real world will limit the application of the new technology.  Henry J. 
Aaron, Health Care Rationing: Inevitable but Impossible?, 96 GEO. L.J. 539, 540 (2008).  Similarly, dental 
Medicaid reform success must be measured in terms of its total impact on individuals and society.  High 
utilization rates may not necessarily translate into good dental health.  Thus, this empirical evidence may 
not provide a complete picture of the state of dental health.  The qualitative analysis provided in Section VI 
tries to fill some of these gaps.            
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single vendor or multiple vendors.  Fourth, the state must then determine the amount of 
financial risk that the vendor or vendors should bear.  Lastly, states have the option of 
limiting how much risk vendors can transfer to dental providers.   
To best improve provider participation and utilization of care by enrollees, states 
should contract with a single commercial vendor to exclusively provide dental benefits.  
The state should assume at least some degree of risk, while capitalizing on the vendor’s 
established network, expertise, and commonplace claims procedures.  The state should 
also provide that the vendor must pay providers on a fee-for-service basis.     
 
a. Carve-out vs. Integration 
 
States should carve out their dental program from the traditional Medicaid 
structures.  Carve-outs result in more effective administration of dental benefits.143  
Separate dental programs receive their own budget and own separate administrator.  A 
separate budget prevents funds from being diverted from dental benefits to medical 
benefits.144  Both courts and states have sponsored carve-outs as appropriate remedies for 
addressing previously unmet and overlooked needs.145  Such was the impetus behind 
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143 Of the sixteen states that demonstrated above average utilization in 2009 while still reimbursing 
providers less than average rates in 2010, eleven states used carve outs, while six used integrated structures.  
See Appendix C; see also Appendix E.   
144 Kim McPherson, State Strategies to Improve Dental Compliance in Missouri’s Medicaid Population, 
supra note 58, at 9. 
145 While this piece focuses on failures by Medicaid programs to address dental health in underage 
populations, Medicaid programs may also have to address the special dental needs of other populations.  
For a discussion of the adjustments states must make to Medicaid structures to help young children, 
pregnant women, people with developmental disabilities, and people in rural areas, see Andrew Snyder, 
Increasing Access to Dental Care in Medicaid: Targeted Programs for Four Populations, supra note 46.    
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Tennessee’s reforms.146  These approaches suggest that carve-outs are better suited for 
addressing the needs of specific undertreated populations.  Tennessee’s carve-out now 
works within the state’s budget.  Legislators directly allocate funds each year to dental 
health.147  Underfunding becomes a conscious act of resource allocation, not a mere 
oversight.  These dental programs also benefit from an administrator whose expertise and 
focus relates just to dental health.  Additionally, carve-outs allow for greater 
accountability when dental performance stands alone from medical performance.148  Poor 
dental health cannot hide behind the cloak of improvement in other health measurements.  
Dental providers typically prefer carve-outs to both managed care structures and state-run 
structures that administer both medical and dental benefits.149  Neither dentists nor 
doctors are trained to practice both medicine and dentistry.150  Challenges may exist in 
creating systems that would allow the sharing of information between doctors and 
dentists.151  Thus, carve-outs may allow for the more effective administration of dental 
Medicaid benefits.        
On the other hand, integration of dental and health benefit administration does 
present some benefits.  Integration allows for care coordination.  For example, New 
Jersey’s managed care organizations expedite organ transplants that require preliminary 
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146 David Neumeister, State and Community Models for Improving Access to Dental Care for the 
Underserved – A White Paper, supra note 59, at 15. 
147 Id. at 17.  
148 Burton L. Edelstein, Understanding the Connecticut Dental Medicaid Reform Proposal: State Options 
in Contracting Dental Care in Medicaid (Connecticut Health Foundation, Hartford, CT), Mar. 2003, at 5 
(available at http://www.cthealth.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/understanding-the-ct-dental-medicaid-
reform-proposal.pdf). 
149 Alison Borchgrevink, Andrew Snyder, & Shelly Gehshan, The Effects of Medicaid Reimbursement 
Rates on Access to Dental Care, supra note 20, at 6. 
150 Caroline Davis & Gretchen Brown, Managing California’s Medicaid Dental Program: Lessons from 
Other States, supra note 72, at 13.  
151 Id.  
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dental clearance.152  States can also ensure that dental benefits receive proper funding by 
laying out specific minimum benefits in their contracts with MCOs.  For example, 
Arizona sets minimum benefit standards for MCOs.153  These benefits include ensuring 
that beneficiaries can see the dentist at least twice a year for preventive care and the care 
that they receive is consistent with the community standard of care.154  Arizona also 
requires that MCOs maintain adequate networks.155  These improvements in care 
coordination are possible in an integrated Medicaid structure.     
Integration may also improve utilization by capitalizing off of Medicaid 
beneficiaries’ tendencies to seek primary care more so than dental care.  Arizona requires 
that physicians screen Medicaid enrollees for dental health problems and refer them to 
dentists.156  In New Jersey, AmeriChoice pays physicians forty percent of their original 
reimbursement amount if the referral results in a dental visit.157  The plan reported that 
utilization doubles for beneficiaries that see physicians that refer.158  However, budgets 
are further strained by this reimbursement system as physicians need to reimbursed for 
screening patients.  Additionally, just one trip to the dentist creates unique dilemmas for 
Medicaid enrollees.  Enrollees usually lack access to transportation, cannot afford 
childcare and must pay public transportation rates for their children to make the trip as 
well, and must travel long distances to more affluent areas where dentists tend to 
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152 Id. at 10.  
153 Id. at 9; Medical Policy Manual §§ 430(A)(7)(b)(1), 430(C).  
154 Caroline Davis & Gretchen Brown, Managing California’s Medicaid Dental Program: Lessons from 
Other States, supra note 72, at 9. 
155 Id.  
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157 Id. at 10.  
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practice.159  Facing these barriers twice may not be feasible for patients facing these 
barriers.  Thus, carve-outs allow states to avoid these dilemmas.      
In practice, states that have used carve-outs have experienced success in 
improving access and utilization.  In Tennessee, provider participation improved by more 
than one hundred twenty percent following a series of reforms to the dental Medicaid 
program, including the switch to a carve-out.160  Utilization by children improved from 
thirty-six percent to fifty-one percent within four years of these reforms.161  On the other 
hand, Arizona, which relies on MCOs to administer both dental and medical benefits, has 
also experienced success.  Medicaid utilization increased from below thirty percent in 
2000 when payment structure reform had just taken place to 47.2% in 2009.162  Both 
experience and reason suggest that carving out dental benefits from the administration of 
other Medicaid benefits can eventually lead to more Medicaid children receiving more 
dental care.   
 
b. Administration through Private Vendor vs. Self-administration 
 
States should hire private vendors to administer dental benefits, rather than 
administer benefits themselves.  In fact, many states already use fiscal agents to handle 
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159 See Andrew Snyder, Increasing Access to Dental Care in Medicaid: Targeted Programs for Four 
Populations, supra note 46, at 5; see also June Thomas, The American Way of Dentistry: Why poor folks 
are short on teeth., supra note 6.      
160 Alison Borchgrevink, Andrew Snyder, & Shelly Gehshan, The Effects of Medicaid Reimbursement 
Rates on Access to Dental Care, supra note 20, at 8.  
161 Id. 
162 The State of Children’s Dental Health: Making Coverage Matter – Arizona, supra note 84.   
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administrative tasks, including processing claims and responding to provider inquiries.163  
However, these fiscal agents come in many forms, some specializing in information 
technology and others specializing in maintaining dental provider networks.164  States 
should opt for commercial vendors that already maintain private networks.  Fiscal agents 
specialized in information technology can effectively process claims, but they lack a 
personal connection to providers.  Through private administration, states can build on 
already existing provider networks instantaneously while drawing on experience that 
transcends basic administrative tasks.165  Managed care professionals have more 
experience in quality review and adjustment compared to state employees.166  
Additionally, dental providers prefer claims processes and payment systems that align 
with the commercial plans through which they are already paid.167  Submitting claims to 
government agencies that use separate codes and take longer to process payments 
presents an unnecessary obstacle between the provider and the major financial incentives.  
Clearly, the use of a private commercial agent provides many benefits.  
The involvement of managed care with Medicaid programs is not without its 
critics, however.  Some argue that because a managed care contract builds in some degree 
of profit margin, contracting with a commercial vendor entails an unnecessary extra level 
of expense.168  Others have criticized how haphazardly states entered into managed care 
agreements in the 1990s with plans that were not experienced in administering benefits to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
163 Only nine states administer all dental Medicaid benefits themselves.  The rest use some sort of a 
commercial agent to administer at least some benefits. Medicaid Compendium Update (American Dental 
Assn., Chicago, IL), 2008 (available at http://www.ada.org/2123.aspx). 
164See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.    
165 Burton L. Edelstein, Understanding the Connecticut Dental Medicaid Reform Proposal: State Options 
in Contracting Dental Care in Medicaid, supra note 148, at 4.    
166 Id. 
167 James J. Crall & Donald Schneider, Medicaid Program Administration, supra note 31, at 1.   
168 Burton L. Edelstein, Understanding the Connecticut Dental Medicaid Reform Proposal: State Options 
in Contracting Dental Care in Medicaid, supra note 148, at 4. 
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Medicaid patients.169  Because of the complexity of establishing effective oversight and 
review procedures, establishing these programs may take over two years.170  States must 
also ensure that vendors have the resources to address the unique needs of Medicaid 
patients.  Commercial vendors typically do not have enough staff capable of speaking 
other languages.171  Commercial vendors also do not usually operate networks in poor 
areas, so transportation then becomes a new concern.172  However, states can address 
these concerns without necessarily abandoning the option to contract with commercial 
vendors.  The responsibility falls upon the state to not rush into these agreements without 
ensuring that the vendor can address these challenges.  Contracting with only a single 
vendor will ease the burden of negotiation and later performance review.  States can also 
adopt data collection, monitoring, and evaluation modules that have worked in states 
already using a private vendor system.173  By adopting such measures, states can evaluate 
whether the administrative efficiencies of third-party administration have reduced costs 
or improved dental health enough to substantiate the extra profit margin built into the 
managed care contract.        
 Some states appealed to the needs of providers without contracting out 
administrative duties.  For example, South Carolina eased administrative burdens without 
turning to a commercial vendor.174  Provider participation in South Carolina subsequently 
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169 Axelrod, supra note 111, at.  
170 Burton L. Edelstein, Understanding the Connecticut Dental Medicaid Reform Proposal: State Options 
in Contracting Dental Care in Medicaid, supra note 148, at 4. 
171 Axelrod, supra note 111, at 264. 
172 Id. at 265.  
173 For example, Rhode Island created an Oral Health Module to monitor the success of their managed care 
vendor.  See Christine A. Payne, Baseline Oral Health Indicators (Rhode Island State Action for Oral 
Health Access Project), 2005 (available at 
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increased by 93.4% in six years.175  Alternatively, states that have contracted with private 
commercial vendors experienced similar improvements in less time.  Rhode Island 
witnessed an over seven hundred percent increase in just two years.176  In Tennessee, 
provider participation improved 111.7% in three years.177  The use of private commercial 
vendors allows states to tap into already existing networks immediately.  Given the state 
of dental health, many enrollees may not be able to wait six years until they can finally 
see a dentist.     
 
c. Single Vendor vs. Multiple Vendors   
 
States should contract with a single vendor rather than multiple vendors.  This 
structure best addresses the interests of both providers and patients.  Providers may not be 
interested in navigating through different claims processes.178  In Tennessee, providers 
only deal with a single set of rules, a single claims payer, a single agreement, a single 
credentialing process, and a single fee schedule.179  As each one of these procedures may 
be unique to each vendor, the potential for inconvenience is clear.  Patients may also be 
confused by multiple different options.180  Furthermore, by contracting with only a single 
vendor, the state will reduce administrative costs while allowing for stronger oversight.181  
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175 Alison Borchgrevnik, Andrew Snyder, & Shelly Gehshan, Increasing Access to Dental Care in 
Medicaid: Does Raising Provider Rates Work?, supra note 122, at 3. 
176 Caroline Davis & Gretchen Brown, Managing California’s Medicaid Dental Program: Lessons from 
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Virginia relies on a single dental benefits administrator and benefits from the 
centralization of data.182  Virginia works with the vendor to analyze the data.183  A vendor 
competing within a multiple-vendor system does not have such an ability to assess the 
full scope of dental health within the state.  The single-vendor system, thus, aligns with 
the interests of states, providers, and the patients.   
Multiple-vendor systems offer some advantages as well, but these primarily help 
just the state rather than providers and patients.  Multiple vendors can compete against 
each other, thus potentially lowering the cost of dental benefits for the state.184  A 
multiple-vendor system also provides the state the benefit of cross-plan performance 
review.185  This allows states to differentiate between plan-specific deficiencies and 
systemic deficiencies.  Additionally, some note that the multiple-vendor systems that 
have failed in the past failed primarily due to a lack of funding, as opposed to any 
inherent flaw.186  A multiple-vendor system provides the state with some unique 
advantages, but providers and patients may be left confused and frustrated. 
Overall, a single-vendor system can most effectively and efficiently administer 
dental Medicaid benefits.  A single-vendor system benefits all parties involved – the 
state, dental providers, and Medicaid beneficiaries.  A multiple-vendor system benefits 
the state in some ways, but it inconveniences both providers and patients in others.  
Contracting and performance review also becomes a laborious process if done properly.          
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182 Shelly Gehshan, Andrew Snyder, & Julie Paradise, Filling an Urgent Need: Improving Children’s 
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d. Degree of Risk Placed on Vendor 
 
In structuring the contract with the single vendor, states should refrain from 
placing the entire risk of the program on the vendor.  Risk should be mitigated through 
risk-sharing and gain-sharing clauses or administrative services only contracts.  As 
Medicaid is an individual entitlement, the entity at risk cannot deny care when funding is 
depleted.187  This makes calculating risk difficult.188  Because of this, managed care 
organizations often avoid accepting full-risk contracts.189  Practically speaking, it may be 
the case that the state has no other option but to accept some degree of risk.   
Even if a vendor wishes to accept full risk, the vendor may be conflicted between 
encouraging utilization and simultaneously cutting costs.190  Historically, programs that 
have refrained from full-risk contracts have experienced more success.  Rhode Island 
employed risk-sharing and gain-sharing.191  On the other hand, Florida tried a similar 
program that differed in that it placed full risk on its vendor.192  Florida’s program failed, 
as providers dropped out and access became more limited.193  Florida’s program also 
failed to bring about the theoretical cost-savings, the purpose behind transferring full 
risk.194  In Rhode Island, patients visited dentists fifty percent more frequently and 
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provider participation increased by over seven hundred percent.195   Tennessee and 
Virginia have used administrative services only contracts.  Tennessee and Virginia have 
also improved access and utilization.196  Successes in these states contrasted with 
Florida’s less fortunate experience demonstrate the importance of the state retaining some 
risk.  To ensure that dental Medicaid administration encourages the maximum amount of 
utilization, states should avoid creating adverse incentives.  No-risk or mitigated-risk 
contracts would achieve better results.       
 
e. Degree of Risk Placed on Provider  
 
Just as vendors should not fully bear the burden of financial risk, providers should 
also not bear this risk.  Arizona explicitly prohibited its managed care plans from passing 
risk on to providers by paying on a per beneficiary per month basis rather than on a fee-
for-service basis.197  Participation subsequently increased.198  Most dental providers rely 
on fee-for-service payments from private insurers.199  For this reason, capitation 
represents an inconvenience that most dentists have never had to adapt to.  Additionally, 
under private plans that do capitate dental providers, access sometimes suffers because 
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dentists have no financial incentive to actually treat patients.200  Capitation aligns 
incentives with current barriers to utilization of dental care by Medicaid patients.  
Dentists will be less likely to schedule follow-up appointments, reach out to patients who 
have not received preventive care in a long time, or try to solve the problems involved 
with missed appointments.  Capitation has also resulted in decreased patient satisfaction 
in California.  Under California’s Healthy Family Program (HFP), the three dental 
maintenance organization plans that capitate providers have proven more cost-effective 
than the fee-for-service exclusive provider organization plans, but patient satisfaction 
remains lower in these plans.201  Because states should avoid inconveniencing dental 
providers in order to encourage utilization, states should opt for the more familiar fee-for-
service payment system and absorb the possible extra costs associated with it.  
 
VII. Conclusion 
 
Together with increases to reimbursement rates and the creation of new outreach 
initiatives, administrative reform can set states in a positive direction to improving dental 
health in the Medicaid population.  States can customize administrative structures to the 
exact needs of Medicaid providers and patients.  Any costs related to contracting out 
administrative duties and subsequent performance review will be recouped once a culture 
of proactive dental care is fostered in the minds of Medicaid patients and once these 
patients can actually find that care.  A proactive system where patients receive early !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
200 What are HMO Dental Insurance Plans?, Dental Insurance Helper, 
http://www.dentalinsurancehelper.com/dental-insurance-articles/hmo-dental-insurance.htm (last visited 
Feb. 29, 2012).  
201 Caroline Davis & Gretchen Brown, Managing California’s Medicaid Dental Program: Lessons from 
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preventive care will prove much less costly than a reactive system where patients who 
have never seen a dentist rely on emergency room services.  Both states and patients alike 
cannot afford to allow this dental health crisis to grow any worse by doing nothing to 
adapt Medicaid structures to the realities of the situation.     
Appendix A
Trends in Utilization Provider Participation
State Time SpanIncreases in Utilization Increases in Participation Rate Trend
National Avg. 9 Years ~46 N/A
TN 2 Years 38.5 81.3 increased to 75th
2002-2009 3 Years 38.5 111.7
8 Years ~78.5 N/A
SC 1 Year 4.3 31.8 75th percentile
2000-2011 2 Years N/A 43.1 but not raised since
6 Years 47.5 N/A
7 Years 63.8 93.4
11 Years ~98.9 N/A
AZ 1 Year 10.5 N/A 2010 - 68.9% of dentists' median retail fees
2002-2009 5 Years 25.3 N/A
7 Years ~57.3 ~70.3
RI 1 Year N/A ~500 2006 - $7.82 per kid per month
2005-2010 5 Years 28.1 703.7 2010 - 35.4% of dentists' median retail fees (weighted average)
MI 2 Years ~30 150 83-111% of average charges in region
2000-2009 6 Years 43 N/A but $25 per service less than national 75th percentile
9 Years ~75.2 N/A
VA 1 Year >30 21 fee schedule increased by 28%
2005-2007 2 Years N/A 76.9
IN 3 Years 77.8 42.3 Increased rates but haven't adjusted 
1997-2007 8 Years ~122* 85.3 for inflation
10 Years N/A 87.4
NJ 1 Year 1 N/A Medicaid Rates are about 1st-3rd percentile of State Percentiles
2000-2006 3 Years 29.4 N/A Resisted Increasing Rates
6 Years 52.9 N/A
Miami-Dade 2 Years -42 -59 Only Paid $4.28 per patient per month 
County Pilot
2003-2005
*(but enrollment declined)
Sources
TN
SC
AZ
RI
MI
VA
IN
NJ
Miami-Dade 
County Pilot
Understanding the Impacts of Florida’s Medicaid Pre-Paid Dental Pilot, Oral Health Issue Brief (Community Voices Miami, Miami, FL), Aug. 2006 
Caroline Davis & Gretchen Brown, Managing California’s Medicaid Dental Program: Lessons from Other States (California HealthCare Foundation, Oakland, CA), July 2009. 
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Appendix B
Summary of State Approaches to Dental Medicaid Administration
TN SC AZ RI MI VA IN NJ Dade County Model Reform
Carve-out vs. Integration Carve-out Integration Integration Carve-Out Still 
integrated 
but dental 
benefits are 
administered 
separately in 
the counties 
selected for 
the pilot 
program
Carve-out Carve-Out Integration Carve-Out Carve-Out
Managed Care vs. Self-Administration Managed 
Care
Self-
Administration
Managed 
Care
Managed 
Care
Managed 
Care
Managed 
Care
Self-
Administered 
(other 
Medicaid 
benefits are 
administered 
through 
managed 
care)
Managed 
Care
Managed 
Care
Managed 
Care
Single Vendor vs. Multiple Vendors Single DBM - 18 MCOs Single Vendor Single DBM 
for counties 
participating 
in pilot
Single DBM - Single Vendor Single Vendor
Degree of Risk on Vendor ASO Contract - Full Risk on 
Vendors
Risk-Sharing 
& Gain-
Sharing 
Provisions 
ASO contract ASO Contract - Full Risk on 
Vendors
Full Risk on 
Vendor
State retains 
some degree 
of risk
Provider Reimbursement Structure -
FFS vs. Capitation
FFS FFS FFS 
(capitation 
explicitly 
prohibited)
FFS FFS FFS FFS (changed 
from 
capitation)
Both FFS & 
Capitation
Capitation FFS
Appendix C
2009 Utilization Rates and 2010 Payment Rates by State
State
Utilization 
Rate (2009)
Payment 
Rate (2010)
AK 42 91.4
DC 44.6 84.1
DE 41.1 80
CT 42.5 78.5
MD 41.8 70.7
AZ 47.2 68.9
MA 52.3 68.6
LA 41.8 67.9
TN 46.4 67.3
ND 36.9 66.2
WY 43.5 65.3
OK 46 64.4
AR 57.1 63.9
TX 59.8 63.8
WV 48.5 62.5
SD 46 62.4
MS 45.5 61.9
NH 54.2 61.8
NATIONAL 43.8 60.5
VA 45.7 59.4
IN 47.4 58
NY 38.4 57.3
SC 51.9 57.1
MT 29.9 55.6
NC 51.1 55.5
KS 45.4 55
NV 41.9 54.7
VT 57.3 54.5
AL 49.9 53.6
NM 49.8 53.5
KY 40.8 51.9
GA 42.5 51.9
CO 46.6 51.1
NE 52.5 49.4
PA 37.3 48.8
IL 46.5 48.4
IA 53.8 46.8
MO 30.3 46.7
WA 52.4 46.5
ME 40.3 46.5
MI 36.8 45.9
OH 42.7 43.9
OR 38.8 43.3
ID 67.7 43
NJ 40.9 42.8
MN 42.1 40.1
HW 45.8 37.7
WI 30.1 36.4
RI 46.7 35.4
UT 42.6 33.2
CA 38.9 32.8
FL 25.7 27.5
Sources
The State of Children’s Dental Health: Making Coverage Matter (The Pew Center on the States, Washington, D.C.), May 2011. 
Note: Green shading indicates that state 
demonstrated above average rates of 
utilization. 
Appendix D
2007 Utilization Rates and Payment Rates by State
State
Median 
Retail 
Fee
Medicaid 
Reimbursement 
Rates
Percent of 
Median Retail 
Fee Reimbursed 
by Medicaid Utilization Rates
MS 33 N/A N/A 38.1
DE 35 N/A N/A 35.5
KY 33 N/A N/A 24.5
NJ 35 37 105.71 33.9
DC 35 35 100.00 35.5
SD 35 34 97.14 37
NV 35 33.24 94.97 27.5
CT 37 35 94.59 41.4
TX 32 29.44 92.00 53.7
WY 35 32 91.43 37.3
AZ 35 29.5 84.29 40.1
AR 32 26.6 83.13 29.5
MD 35 29.08 83.09 36.1
NY 35 29 82.86 33.7
AK 46 38 82.61 41.9
NH 37 29 78.38 47
IL 36 28 77.78 40.1
LA 32 24.8 77.50 32.4
NC 35 27.01 77.17 45.7
TN 33 25 75.76 40.2
OK 32 23.5 73.44 42.7
MA 37 27 72.97 44.6
ND 35 24.1 68.86 28.1
MO 35 24 68.57 27.9
SC 35 23.4 66.86 46.9
National N/A N/A 65.99 38.1
NM 35 22.97 65.63 47.6
GA 35 22.77 65.06 23.8
HW 46 29.12 63.30 39.9
IN 36 22.58 62.72 43
MT 35 21.89 62.54 29.2
KS 35 21 60.00 41.2
CO 35 20.8 59.43 40.2
VA 35 20.15 57.57 40.8
WV 35 20 57.14 45.6
PA 35 20 57.14 32.2
AL 33 18 54.55 51.9
VT 37 20 54.05 57.1
MN 35 18.7 53.43 37.7
OR 46 24.07 52.33 34.9
ID 35 17.76 50.74 42.8
UT 35 17.55 50.14 39.5
WA 46 22.44 48.78 47.6
IA 35 16.63 47.51 46.9
OH 36 17.08 47.44 39.9
NE 35 16 45.71 49.9
WI 36 15.92 44.22 25.7
FL 35 15 42.86 23.5
MI 36 14.89 41.36 34.5
ME 37 13 35.14 37.1
CA 46 15 32.61 31.3
RI 37 10 27.03 43.8
Sources
Cynthia Stark, Oral Health Checkup: Progress in Tough Fiscal Times?, National Health Policy Forum, Issue Brief No. 836 (March 29, 2010) (available at http://www.nhpf.org/library/issue-briefs/IB836_OralHealthCheckup_03-29-2010.pdf).
The State of Children’s Dental Health: Making Coverage Matter (The Pew Center on the States, Washington, D.C.), May 2011 at 25 (available at http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/The_State_of_Children's_Dental_health.pdf).      
Note: Green shading indicates that state 
demonstrated above average rates of utilization. 
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State Approaches to Dental Medicaid Administration
State
Carve-out or 
Integration? Administration Payment Type
AL Integrated 
Single Nonrisk 
Contractor FFS
AK Integrated 
Single Nonrisk 
Contractor FFS
AZ Integrated MCOs FFS
AR Integrated
Single Nonrisk 
Contractor FFS
CA
EPSDT services 
(including oral health 
assessments) 
administered by state 
agency / Dental 
provider diagnostic, 
preventative and 
treatment services are 
managed by Denti-Cal 
(through Delta Dental)
EPSDT services 
administered by 
state /  Other 
preventative and 
restorative 
services - 95% 
FFS administator 
/ 5% MCOs
Mostly FFS/Some 
Capitation in 
Populated Counties 
(dentists are 
employees in one 
plan)
CO
Integrated (but 
dentists directly enroll 
with state ffs program 
while physicians 
participate in managed 
care plans, primary 
care physician plans, 
or ffs plan) State Agency FFS
CT
Carve-out (Other 
benefits administered 
through managed 
care)
Single Nonrisk 
Contractor FFS
DE
Carve-out (Other 
benefits administered 
through managed 
care)
State Agency 
(directly enroll 
with state under 
ffs program or in 
8 state-operated 
clinics)
FFS (before 1997, 
dentists were hired as 
employees of clinics)
DC
Integrated (but MCOs 
subcontract with 
dental care 
organizations (DCOS) 
to managed program 
that pays on ffs basis) MCOs FFS
FL Integrated
Both State 
Administered 
Plans & 
Managed Care 
Plans
FFS in State 
Administered Plans 
(except in a few 
counties) / Capitation 
in Managed Care 
Plans
GA
Integrated (but MCOs 
subcontract with 
dental care 
organizations (DCOS) 
to managed program 
that pays on ffs basis) MCOs FFS
HW
Carve-out (Other 
benefits administered 
through managed 
care)
Single Nonrisk 
Contractor FFS
ID
Carve-out (Other 
benefits administered 
through primary care 
case management 
system)
Single Nonrisk 
Contractor FFS
IL
Carve-out (Other 
benefits administered 
through primary care 
case management 
system)
Single Nonrisk 
Contractor FFS
IN
Carve-out (Other 
benefits administered 
through managed 
care)
Multiple Nonrisk 
Contractors FFS
IA
Carve-out (Other 
benefits administered 
through managed 
care)
Multiple Nonrisk 
Contractors FFS
KS
Carve-out (Other 
benefits administered 
through both a ffs 
system and managed 
care)
Single Nonrisk 
Contractor FFS
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KY
Integrated (managed 
care plans subcontract 
with DCO and primary 
care case 
management manages 
through nonrisk fiscal 
agents)
Managed Care 
(25%) /  
Nonrisk Agents 
(75%) FFS
LA Integrated State Agency FFS
ME Integrated State Agency FFS
MD
Integrated (but MCOs 
subcontract with 
dental care 
organizations (DCOS)) 
but state began 
initiative to start carve-
out in 2008
Managed Care 
Plans (95%) / 
State-
administered 
(5% but state 
seeks to 
develop)
FFS (All plans have to 
reimburse ffs if the 
benefit is covered by 
the ffs program, but 
MCOs are free to 
negotiate with 
providers if benefit is 
not covered by ffs 
program)
MA
Carve-out (Other 
benefits administered 
through mostly 
managed care)
Single Nonrisk 
Contractor (with 
Subcontractor) FFS
MI
Carve-out (other 
benefits administered 
through MCOs or 
Medicaid Health Plans)
State Agency 
(68%) / Nonrisk 
Contractor 
(32%) FFS
MN
Integrated (started a 
pilot program to 
experiment with a non-
managed care carve-
out but program is 
being phased out)
MCOs (and 
subcontractors) 
(83%) - except 
where pilot still 
operates (17%) Both FFS & Capitation
MS Integrated
Single Nonrisk 
Contractor FFS
MO Integrated
Single Managed 
Care Plan 
administered by 
2 DCOs (63%) - 
except in 
counties without 
managed care 
(state 
administers ffs 
program w/ 
fiscal agent) 
(37%)
Capitated (63%) / 
FFS (37%)
MT Integrated
Single Nonrisk 
Contractor FFS
NE Integrated
State 
administered 
managed care 
program FFS
NV
Integrated (but ffs 
program is carved out 
of managed care in 
rural areas)
Nonrisk 
Contractor 
Administered in 
Rural Counties 
(32%) / 2 MCOs 
(68%) FFS
NH Integrated 
Single Nonrisk 
Contractor FFS
NJ Integrated
Managed Care 
(91%) / State-
administered 
(w/ fiscal agent) 
(9% - including 
special needs 
children)
Mostly FFS / Some 
Capitation
NM Integrated
MCOs (w/ 
subcontractors) 
(80%) / State-
administered 
(w/ fiscal agent) 
(20% - including 
Native American 
children) but 
shifting to 
managed care FFS
NY Integrated
28 MCOs (80%) 
/ State-
administered 
(w/ fiscal agent) 
(20%)
Both FFS & Capitation 
(and combination 
thereof)
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NC
Carve-out (Medical 
benefits administered 
through 2 primary 
care care management 
programs but dental 
services are 
exempted)
Single Nonrisk 
Contractor FFS
ND
Carve-out (medical 
benefits administered 
through primary care 
case management 
program but dental 
services are excluded) State Agency FFS
OH Integrated
Managed Care 
(83%) / State-
administered 
(17%) FFS
OK Integrated
State Agency 
(w/ fiscal agent)
FFS (before - 2004 - 
allowed capitation for 
nonrural areas)
OR Integrated
MCOs (w/ 
subcontractors) 
(96%) / State-
administered 
(4% - mostly 
Native American 
children) 
Capitated (96%) / 
FFS (4%)
PA Integrated
Nonrisk 
Contractor 
(27%) / 
Managed Care 
(73%) FFS
RI
Carve-out (medical 
benefits administered 
through multiple 
managed care plans 
but transitioning from 
state-administered ffs 
program to single MCO 
w/ risk-sharing
Single MCO 
(31%) / State-
administered 
(69%) FFS
SC Integrated State Agency FFS
SD
Carve-out (Medical 
benefits administered 
through primary care 
care management 
program)
Single Nonrisk 
Contractor 
(2007 - 
renegotiated 
contract to 
exclude risk) FFS
TN
Carve-out (medical 
benefits administered 
through several 
managed care plans)
Single Nonrisk 
Contractor FFS
TX
Carve-out (Medical 
benefits administered 
through primary care 
care management 
program or managed 
care plans)
Single Nonrisk 
Contractor FFS
UT
Carve-out (rural 
counties  - other 
benefits administered 
through primary care 
case management 
program, managed 
care or traditional ffs; 
urban counties - 
managed care)
State-
administered FSS
VT
Carve-out (Medical 
benefits administered 
through primary care 
care management 
program)
Two Nonrisk 
Contractors 
working 
together FFS
VA
Carve-out (Medical 
benefits administered 
through primary care 
care management 
program, managed 
care, and some 
through traditional ffs)
Single Nonrisk 
Contractor FFS
WA
Carve-out (medical 
benefits administered 
through several 
managed care plans)
State-
administered FFS
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WV
Carve-out (Medical 
benefits administered 
through primary care 
care management 
program and managed 
care)
Single Nonrisk 
Contractor FFS
WI
Partial carve-out (most 
receive medical 
benefits through 
managed care)
Single Nonrisk 
Contractor 
(60%) / MCOs 
(subcontracting 
w/ DCOs) (40% - 
urban counties)
FFS (Nonrisk 
Contractor) / Both 
FFS & Capitated 
(MCOs)
WY Carve-out 
Single Nonrisk 
Contractor FFS
Source
Medicaid Compendium Update (American Dental Assn., Chicago, IL), 2008. 
Are dental 
benefits 
administered 
separately?
Integrated 25
Carve-out 22
Both 4
How many used 
contractors?
State-
administered 9
Commercial 
Vendor 32
Both 10
Of those using 
contractors, 
how many 
states 
transferred risk 
to vendors?
Vendors assume 
some risk 11
Vendors assume 
no risk 24
Some vendors 
assume risk, but 
others do not 7
Of those using 
contractors, 
how many 
contactors are 
used?
Used multiple 
vendors 21
Used only one 
vendor 21
Provider 
Reimbursement 
Type
FSS 42
Just Capitation 0
Both 9
